What we told the OAS and UN freedom of expression rapporteurs about Paraguay

In October 2026, we submitted two contributions to the main international freedom of expression mechanisms: one to the Office of the Special Rapporteur of the IACHR for its Annual Report, and another to the United Nations Special Rapporteur to help define the priorities of the 2026-2029 mandate. Here we share what we brought and what we asked for.

The past year was especially difficult for those who exercise freedom of expression in Paraguay. Between November 2025 and October 2026, we documented a disinformation network targeting the press, allegedly linked to the Government; digital attacks against women journalists, women human rights defenders and TLGBIQA+ people; a law that controls civil society organizations; and the expansion of biometric surveillance without safeguards. Together, these events form a pattern with a chilling effect on public debate.

That is why we took this evidence to two international forums:

The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (RELE) of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), led by Pedro Vaca Villarreal, to which we sent our contribution on the last day of his mandate, so that it can be handed over to the new Rapporteur and included in the Paraguay chapter of the Annual Report.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, who opened a consultation to define the strategic priorities of the mandate, to be presented to the Human Rights Council in June 2027.

Both contributions draw on our research, case support and strategic litigation. Here we review the main points.

What we told the IACHR Special Rapporteur

A disinformation network against the press

We systematized the investigation “The Disinformation Network”, which documented fourteen pages operating as pseudo-media outlets and anonymous “smear campaign” accounts, with more than USD 472,000 spent on Meta ads. The network is linked to the digital communications team of the presidential campaign, whose members now hold positions at the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies (MITIC). Its main target was the press: 47% of the hostile mentions on one of its pages were aimed at journalists and media outlets. It also showed a clear gender bias: women made up 37.5% of the journalists attacked but received 60% of the attacks, including fake audio generated with artificial intelligence.

The official response made things worse. The MITIC minister called the journalist who authored the investigation a “liar”, an “activist” and a “communist”; more than 60 ads disappeared; and the Public Prosecutor’s Office initially referred the case to the Comptroller General’s Office. To date, no one has been charged.

Young journalists in the crosshairs

We included the case of Fiorella Rivarola, a 21-year-old journalist who exposed the dilapidated state of a school in Horqueta. The Ministry of Education publicly discredited her, pro-government media portrayed her as an “influencer”, and a page from the same network accused her of spreading fake news. When an authority uses the legitimacy of the State to stigmatize a journalist, the message reaches every voice that holds power to account.

Technology-facilitated gender-based violence

Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) is today one of the main threats to the freedom of expression of women human rights defenders and TLGBIQA+ people. According to our research with women human rights defenders and women’s organizations and with TLGBIQA+ people, 60% of women’s organizations reduced their online presence or self-censored, and half reduced their participation in public debate. We documented attacks by authorities, such as a senator who exposed the personal data of a lesbian artist and her organization. Only one in three affected defenders filed a complaint, and none received a satisfactory response.

The “Garrote Law” and the closing of civic space

Law No. 7363/2024 establishes excessive, discretionary and punitive control over civil society organizations. In December 2025, together with more than 30 organizations from CODEHUPY, we filed an action of unconstitutionality that has yet to be resolved. In the Universal Periodic Review, Paraguay received eight recommendations to repeal or amend the law, and merely “noted” all of them.

Biometric surveillance and opacity

Facial recognition is expanding without a legal framework or impact assessments. The State denied us information about its cameras on security grounds, so in June 2026, together with EFF and CEJIL, we filed a petition before the IACHR. In addition, the law on violence in sports created a mandatory biometric registry to enter stadiums, connected to police databases. Stadiums are spaces of collective expression: the mere awareness of being identified leads to self-censorship.

Access to information without anonymity

The Unified Public Information Access Portal requires every request to be signed with the requester’s individual identity. This leaves a trail of who asks what and turns a right into an act of self-surveillance, especially for those investigating sensitive issues.

Algorithmic transparency in platform work

According to the Fairwork Paraguay 2025 report, none of the six platforms assessed scored above 2 out of 10, demonstrated algorithmic transparency or recognizes workers’ organizations. When an algorithm can deactivate someone without explanation, speaking up becomes a risk.

What we told the UN Special Rapporteur

The contribution to the United Nations had a different goal: to shape the priorities that will guide the mandate over the next three years. From a Global South perspective, we proposed looking at the structural conditions under which freedom of expression is exercised, and not only at preventing censorship. These were our main points:

States also promote disinformation

The global debate tends to focus on private actors and platforms. But the Paraguayan case shows that governments also use disinformation as a strategy of power, with public resources. And they do so through transnational networks: an agency based in Colombia managed ads that mixed official propaganda (26%) with attacks from the page Despierta Paraguay (74%), while agencies based in Argentina operated other pages in the network. Outsourcing disinformation to other countries makes it possible to evade national oversight and platform verification. That is why no State can tackle it alone, and we asked the mandate to prioritize it from a regional perspective.

Surveillance, artificial intelligence and the concentration of technological power

We argued that AI must be treated as a structural challenge: the concentration of data, computing power and infrastructure deepens power asymmetries. The combination of facial recognition, mass data analysis and AI transforms the capacity of States and companies to identify and monitor people, with a particularly serious impact in contexts of protest, journalism and human rights defense.

Other issues we asked to prioritize

TFGBV and gendered disinformation as a cross-cutting theme of the mandate.
The misuse of legitimate laws to censor, such as Law No. 5777/16, applied to impose prior censorship on journalists.
The closing of civic space through “anti-NGO” laws, which are spreading across the region.
Anonymity in access to public information.
Algorithmic transparency and the algorithmic management of work as limits on freedom of expression and association.

We also highlighted the groups that face disproportionate barriers: women journalists, women human rights defenders, TLGBIQA+ people, platform workers, migrants subject to facial recognition in the Triple Frontier, and journalists and activists outside the capital.

How to include those at risk

We proposed safe and anonymous channels for participation, because in contexts of surveillance, requiring identification discourages participation. We know this from our own experience: in an online survey, many TLGBIQA+ people chose “prefer not to say”, and we had to switch to in-person focus groups. We also suggested decentralized consultations in Spanish and Guarani, protection against reprisals, and care-based methodologies.

What we asked for

We asked the IACHR Special Rapporteur to urge the Paraguayan State, in its Annual Report, to:

Repeal Law No. 7363/2024 or bring it in line with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality, and implement the UPR recommendations on the law.
Recognize TFGBV as a restriction on freedom of expression, produce disaggregated official data, and investigate attacks committed or encouraged by public officials.
Independently investigate the source of the funds and the involvement of State agents in the disinformation network, and make the digital advertising agreements public.
Fully comply with the Inter-American Court’s judgment in Leguizamón Zaván et al. v. Paraguay, whose guarantees of non-repetition remain pending, and pass a law to protect journalists and human rights defenders in line with international standards.
Refrain from statements that stigmatize journalists, particularly women and young journalists.
Suspend facial recognition in public spaces and stadiums, including the mandatory biometric registry, until there is a legal framework, impact assessments and independent oversight.
Allow anonymous or institutional requests for access to information.
Ensure that platforms make their algorithms transparent, offer human review and recognize workers’ organizations.

We proposed that the UN Special Rapporteur, among other actions:

Prepare a thematic report on disinformation promoted or financed by States, with a regional and transnational approach.
Recommend a moratorium on facial recognition and AI-based surveillance in public spaces.
Promote linguistic and cultural diversity in AI systems.
Set standards on anonymity in access to public information.
Follow up on the UPR recommendations and coordinate with the IACHR Special Rapporteur to monitor pending Inter-American judgments.
Promote platform due diligence, starting with maintaining and expanding ad libraries, which made it possible to document the disinformation network.

The contributions are in Spanish